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Abstract
The paper focuses on a comparison of bank-based and market-based …nan-
cial systems with respect to their ability to smooth the negative consequences
of a macroeconomic shock. The model describes a two-market OLG economy
with two types of agents (workers and entrepreneurs) and a …nancial system
represented through either banks or a direct market. The dynamic setting
allows for a comparison regarding the speed of economic recovery after the
shock. The principal …nding is that the market-based system provides better
arrangements to speed up the recovery, but concentrates the burden of the
shock in one period. In contrast, the bank-based system allows for both quick
recovery and postponing and smoothing the negative consequences of the
shock over several periods, if proper regulation and interventions are used,
otherwise the banking system can collapse. As an example of regulatory
interventions, liquidity provisions and a deposit rate ceiling are considered.
This allows to give some light on the di¤erence between the roles the Deposit
Insurer and the Regulator (LOLR) can play in the evolution of events. In
particular, deposit insurance alone can not provide an intertemporal shock
smoothing and requires additional regulatory interventions.
Keywords: Financial intermediation, Bank-based system, Market-based
system, Regulation, Deposit insurance
JEL Classi…cation: D50, G21, G28, E44, E53, O16
11 Introduction
A discussion of market- and bank-based …nancial systems, largely initiated
by Allen and Gale (1997, 2000), who give an example of di¤erent e¤ects of an
oil shock in American (market-based) and German (bank-based) economies,
is particularly important for developing countries and countries in transi-
tion. As Bolton (2002) notes, these countries must decide, how to set up
their …nancial system, which type of …nancial system should be adopted,
and what kind of …nancial system would most e¢ciently promote economic
development and growth.
This paper uses the main features of the OLG model with …nancial in-
termediation (Vinogradov, 2003) to study the consequences of an external
shock. The shock considered here is primarily payments shock, which allows
one to focus on other types of shocks in addition to a production shock.
The OLG setting provides a framework to consider the dynamics of events,
and the simple general equilibrium environment enables one to study the
macroeconomic e¤ects of the shock over several periods.
The paper contributes to the macroeconomics of banking, i.e. to the
study of general equilibrium in the presence of …nancial intermediation (see
e.g. works by Bernanke and Gertler, 1987, and Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).
Particular attention is paid to the crisis situation, which is modelled through
an external macroeconomic shock. Exogenous and policy shocks belong to
the sources of …nancial crises (see e.g. Sachs, 1998, who distinguishes between
four triggering mechanisms of …nancial and banking crises: an exogenous
shock, a policy shock, an exhaustion of borrowing limits and a self-ful…lling
panic; and Mishkin, 2001, for analysis of sources of …nancial crises). Rochet
(2004) studies the e¤ect of a macroeconomic (liquidity) shock in a micro-
economic model with moral hazard. The model presented here, in contrast,
focuses on macroeconomic consequences of the shock.
The main feature of the model is an unpredictable shock, which in‡uences
the asset side of the banks’ balance sheets, or directly the earnings of the
population in the case of a market based system. This shock deteriorates
balance sheets of banks and leads to a decrease in the real wages of popula-
tion. As a regulation measure, we assume state guarantees on deposits, which
prevent bank runs, and consider two additional interventions under this as-
sumption: liquidity injections to let banking system to remain solvent1 as
1As usual, we understand solvency as an ability to meet the (current) obligations, in
2well as a deposit rate ceiling, which creates a positive pro…t margin for the
banks to cover their negative capital. Under these circumstances the bank-
based system can recover after the shock and reallocate the burden of the
shock over several periods, whereas the market-based system leads to a huge
burden borne by people in a single period but does not provide intertemporal
risk smoothing.
The paper starts with the description of the model in part 2. In part
3 general equilibrium is de…ned and analyzed in a static as well as in a
dynamic manner. Part 4 of the paper studies the pure market economy and
its evolution after the shock. In part 5 and in part 6 regulatory measures
are introduced and studied in the context of the development of events in
the intermediated economy. The paper concludes with some policy relevant
implications.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents and decisions
Consider the economy with a population, which lives for two periods and
is divided into two groups: workers and entrepreneurs. The whole popula-
tion is distributed at the interval [0;1]; and the subinterval [0;p) belongs to
workers, leaving [p;1] for entrepreneurs, so that p is the share of workers in
this generation.2 The entrepreneurs can only run their …rms as they acquire
some experience in the …rst period of their lives, so that the whole generation
consists only of workers when young. The young generation works, consumes
and saves. The old generation consumes (if workers) or produces and con-
sumes (if entrepreneurs). All workers are therefore endowed with one unit of
labour in each period, and the entrepreneurs possess equal entrepreneurial
skills, which they apply in the second period of their lives, so that there is no
heterogeneity among workers and among entrepreneurs. This setting is sim-
ilar to that of Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2002 a and b), who also consider
contrast to bankruptcy, which means negative capital of the banks. In a static setting
these concepts could coincide. However in a dynamic setting a bankrupt institution (with
negative capital) can still be solvent due to newly acquired funds from the next generations
of depositors.
2We assume here for simplicity that the share of workers in each generation is …xed.
This seems not to be crucial, and qualitatively similar results can be obtained with the
market–side-switching as in Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2002 a and b).
3a macroeconomy with …nancial intermediation and shocks, but …x the size of
investment projects and assume the interest elasticity of savings to be zero.
All the agents of generation t have identical intertemporal utility function
u(ct;ct+1); increasing in consumption in both periods, twice di¤erentiable
and quasi-concave. The time-index denotes the beginning of the period, so
that generation t is born at the moment t when the period t begins, is young
until the moment t + 1, is old in the period t + 1, and dies at the moment
t + 2, which ends the period t + 1.
All agents, when young, solve intertemporal utility maximization prob-
lem, which determines their consumption ct and savings et in period t. The
agents have perfect knowledge about the wage rate wt+1 and interest rates
rd
t and rc
t on deposits and credits correspondingly, which apply to deposits
(credits) made (obtained) in the period t subject to repayment in the period
t + 1.














































t+1 denotes their expected pro…t in the period t+1 after starting








erwise the problem of switching from entrepreneurs to depositors arises (see
e.g. Gersbach and Wenzelburger, 2002 a and b).
Entrepreneurs run …rms when old, and the production technology of these
…rms is given by f (kt+1;lt+1); where kt+1 = physical capital for production
4in period t + 1; and lt+1 = the amount of labour used for production in the
period t+1. All entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology
(so that there is no heterogeneity among entrepreneurs), and maximize their
expected pro…ts, thus determining both kt+1 and lt+1. In period t, potential
entrepreneurs apply for credit, It, to …nance their investment, which is needed
to acquire capital stock kt+1, so that kt+1 = eE
t + It. Note that It ¸ 0 8t.3
The pro…t maximization problem is then








¡ wt+1lt+1 ! max
kt+1;lt+1
(3)





















Note that the solution of the pro…t maximization problem does not de-
pend on the amount of savings accumulated by the entrepreneurs since it
determines the amount of capital stock needed to run the …rm, but not the
amount of borrowed capital (this is a standard fact for a two-period optimiza-
tion problem). Given this optimal choice of production factors, the utility




ct = wt ¡ e
E
t









with (kt+1;lt+1) = argmax¦t+1





















in the pro…t function can be rearranged as (1 + b rt)kt+1








. Obviously, if eE
t is initially smaller than kt+1, and rises
to approach kt+1 (so that It approaches zero), the price of capital 1+ b rt approaches zero,
and the pro…t maximisation problem will imply in…nitely high demand for capital, so that
kt+1 still stay above eE
t .
5Properties of the solutions of the optimization problems are standard.4
2.2 Intermediation and interactions
Financial intermediation is represented in the economy by banks. The banks
collect savings from workers in form of deposits, and o¤er credit to entre-
preneurs to …nance their demand for credits. The entrepreneurial demand
for credit is given by the excess of the optimal capital level, as given by (4),
over the accumulated entrepreneurial savings (7), which play the role of own
funds of the entrepreneurs.
Collection of deposits Dt starts in the period t, when the workers of gen-
eration t create their savings eD
t . At the end of the period t entrepreneurs
apply for credits, It; to start their business (run …rms). Payouts of the entre-
preneurs to banks take place within the period t+1 and amount individually
to Bt+1 = (1+rc
t)It. There is no uncertainty with respect to the production
technology, and the pro…t of the entrepreneurs is always positive, so that the
entrepreneurs never default.
There is no other storage technology in the economy available to workers
so that the value of deposits made with the banks is equal to the value of
aggregate savings of the workers: Dt = peD







t to the depositors.
Entrepreneurs require credit from banks in the amount needed to …nance
their investment demand and we assume that there is no credit rationing. As
a result, no credit application is rejected5, and It = kt+1¡eE
t : Investment (in
production technology) takes place at the end of period t.6 Within the period
t + 1 all entrepreneurs repay to the banks (1 ¡ p)Bt+1 = (1 ¡ p)(1 + rc
t)It.
If in the period t + 1 total repayments from entrepreneurs to banks do
4To prove these properties it su¢ces to …nd respective derivatives of the implicit sav-
ings and factor demand functions, given by the …rst-order conditions. For simplicity the
possibility of corner solutions is excluded, otherwise some partial derivatives can be zero,
which however would not change the analysis.
5Indeed, homogeneity of entrepreneurs implies that their credit applications are of
equal quality, and there is no criterion according to which some of the applications could
be rejected.
6It can be also viewed as though entrepreneurs of the generation t create their produc-
tion facilities along the period t, investing in total kt+1. The investment process ends at
the end of the period t. This implies that all credits are allocated by the banks during the
period t under the interest rate rc
t.
6not cover the total obligations of the banks, the banks experience de…cits








t < 0 (8)
If dt+1 < 0, the banks start the period t + 1 with this non-zero de…cit. If
in some period dt+1 > 0; we shall call it banks’ surplus.
Banks operate in a competitive environment so that neither deposit rates
rd
t nor credit rates rc
t di¤er among banks and we omit any indexes corre-
sponding to individual banks, taking interest rates as uniform in the market.
Moreover, in this competitive environment either banks set the credit and
deposit interest rates equal to oneanother (see e.g. Gersbach, 2003, for dis-
cussion of the case with market-side switching7) or take them equal as given
by the market (see e.g. Baltensperger and Jordan, 1997).8 As a result in
pure competitive environment we have the equality rd
t = rc
t = rt.
Banks are owned by all agents in the economy in equal shares, and the
ownership is transferred to another periods (future generations) through be-
quests. Hence, the stock market for banks’ shares is not considered. Dividend
payments could shift intertemporal budget constraints in the utility maxi-
mization problems solved by the agents, but we assume them to be negligibly
small, and they are not presented in optimization problems (1) and (2) of
the agents above.9
7As noted before, the framework of the current paper can be extended to the case of
heteregeneous agents, in which entrepreneurs decide, whether they apply for the credits
in order to invest into the production technology or they deposit their savings with the
banks. This decision of entrepreneurs depends on their respective quality. See Gersbach
and Wenzelburger (2002 a and b) for details.
8Competition in the banking sector implies that the pro…t of the banks is equal to zero,
which induces the equality between the two interest rates.
9This point deserves some further discussion. Indeed, if we assume that the capital of
the banks is negligeably small, then all the agents will receive in…nitely small dividend
payments, so that they do not in‡uence consumption-savings decisions. Put another way,
we could also assume that the banks belong only to depositors, and resemble in this
sense mutual funds, so that there is no capital, which would di¤er from the deposits.
Alternatively we could assume that dividend payments are made with the rate equal to
deposit ineterest rate, so that the banks’ capital could be considered as being equivalent
to deposits. It is important to note that the (possible) dividends are paid out only in case
the banks work with surplus, dt > 0; otherwise, any possible banks’ pro…t is used to cover
de…cits. As we focus on the case dt · 0, dividend payments do not play a role in the
model.
72.3 Macroeconomic shock
The economy is assumed to experience a negative macroeconomic shock,
which in‡uences the de…cits in the banks in the period t + 1. We assume
the shock to increase the de…cits in the banks proportionally to the amount
repaid by the entrepreneurs
dt+1 = dt ¡ (1 ¡ qt+1)(1 ¡ p)Bt+1 (9)
The shock parameter qt+1 has the following distribution:
qt+1 =
½
1 if t 6= ¿
q¤ < 1 if t = ¿
¾
(10)
Equation (9) can be rewritten for the period ¿ + 1 :
d¿+1 = d¿ ¡ (1 ¡ q
¤)(1 ¡ p)B¿+1 = ¡(1 ¡ q
¤)(1 ¡ p)B¿+1
since d¿ is zero before the shock.
The shock is e¤ectively unpredictable so that banks do not create any
reserves against the shock.
Recall that without the shock, the banks’ de…cits would be









and hence we can equivalently write









We assume that the shock is exogenous and directly in‡uences the de…cits
of the banks. The case of a production shock is considered in Vinogradov
(2003), in which three degrees of shock are introduced: (1) an insigni…cant
production shock, which still leaves entrepreneurs able to repay their oblig-
ations; (2) a signi…cant production shock, which in‡uences repayments to
the banks, but does not in‡uence wage repayments to the workers; and (3)
an extreme shock, which reduces repayments to the banks to zero and leaves
workers underpaid. If no shock occurs (q = 1), then de…cits in the banks stay
at zero level. If the production shock destroys the economy (q = 0), then







t , exactly as in (11).
8The transfer of the shock from production technology directly to de…cits
simpli…es the description of the model and allows for the study of non-
production shocks. One example for this could be a sharp decrease in stock
market prices, which leads to the value of banks’ assets below the value of
liabilities, and hence to de…cits. Since we do not model the stock market
explicitly, and have no securities at the assets side of banks’ balance sheets,
we prefer to say that the exogenous shock in‡uences de…cits directly. Intro-
duction of a stock market would possibly give a more reasonable explanation
for the shock (e.g. through expectations of agents), but would still leave us
with an exogenous disturbance exactly as in case of the de…cit shock, and
would not qualitatively change the results. An alternative treatment of the
shock is discussed in the Appendix.
The shock happens therefore after the entrepreneurs have paid their debts
out, but before the banks have realised these repayments on their balance-
sheets. Intuitively this could be understood as something like iceberg.type
transaction costs, which are proportional to the amount of transaction and
appear just once. This is why we refer to the shock as to a payments shock.
Implicitly it is a generalisation of a production shock mentioned above.
3 Markets and equilibrium
So far, the model so far describes two markets: one for capital and one for
labour. We de…ne the [temporary] equilibrium in the economy in any pe-















under parameters fwt;dtg; which provide that:
1. The capital market is cleared, i.e. aggregate demand for capital equals
aggregate supply of it: (1 ¡ p)k (rc
t;wt+1) = peD
t + dt + (1 ¡ p)eE
t . In









t + dt (12)
2. The labour market is cleared, i.e. aggregate demand for labour, which
is created by old entrepreneurs, equals the aggregate supply of labour,
created by old workers and the whole young generation (both young




t;wt+1) = 1 (13)
93. No agents have incentives to make any changes in their choices (this
condition is met by the optimal choice of agents).
Proposition 1 The general equilibrium, given by de…nition above, exists and
is unique for any period t > 0. It can be represented in the (wt+1;rt)-plane
with an intercept of LM-line and CM-line, depicting equilibria in markets for















For the Proof see Vinogradov (2003)
3.1 Analysis of the Equilibrium
The proposition above allows one to represent the general equilibrium in
terms of two lines in the (wt+1;rt)-plane: LM depicting equilibria in labour
market and CM depicting equilibria in credit market. Note also that changes
in the de…cit level in‡uence only the CM-line and not the LM-line, although
general equilibrium would di¤er for di¤erent values of dt. An increase in
de…cits (or equivalently decrease in surplus, i.e. dt falls below zero) increases
equilibrium interest rate as de…ned by the credit market for any wage level





Proposition 2 The equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium wage level
depend on the de…cits in the banking sector so that the equilibrium interest
rate increases and the equilibrium wage level decreases with an increase in
de…cits (fall in surplus):
10The sign "<" in the formula is due to the fact that an "increase" in de…cits means an











Figure 1: E¤ect of an increase in banks’ de…cits (d #, i.e. banks experience










Intuition behind this is as follows. According to (15) and due to the
labour market equilibrium independence from the de…cits in banking system,
the equilibrium interest rate and wage level are determined by the movement
of general equilibrium point along the LM-line, as shown in …gure (Fig. 1).
Since both CM- and LM-lines are continuous, this reasoning will be valid for
any possible combinations of interest rate and wage level, which proves the
statement.
The e¤ect on the general equilibrium of banks de…cits falling below zero
is shown in Fig. 1. Since the slope of CM-line can be either negative or
positive (but never smaller than the slope of the LM-line), both cases are
presented in the diagram.
3.2 Evolution of the economy
The sequence of events in the economy with …nancial intermediation is pre-
sented in the Figure 2.
11Figure 2: Sequence of events in intermediated economy
3.2.1 Before the shock
If t < ¿, the shock parameter q is always q = 1. The economy has an
equilibrium with zero de…cits in the banks. This equilibrium is stationary
until the shock occurs.
The system of equilibrium conditions (12-13) together with the de…ni-
tion of de…cits (8) determines a dynamic system with respect to w and d:
12©(wt;dt) ! (wt+1;dt+1) with map ©(wt;dt) given implicitly by the system
©(wt;dt) :
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
(1 ¡ p)lt+1 = 1
(1 ¡ p)It = peD
t + dt
dt+1 = (1 ¡ p)Bt+1 ¡ p(1 + rd
t)eD
t
It = kt+1 ¡ eE
t





t = eE (wt;wt+1;rc
t)
eD





Proposition 3 The dynamic system (17) has a steady state (stationary)
with d = 0 and w = b w, which does not depend on initial conditions.
Proof.
The map for de…cits in (17), together with the credit market equilibrium
condition (12) for period t, implies
dt+1 = (1 + r
d
t)dt
which, under a positive deposit interest rate, is true i¤
dt+1 = dt = 0 = d
The …rst part of the statement is hence proved.
Now consider the modi…ed map ©0(wt) ´ ©(wt;0) :
©0(wt) :
½
(1 ¡ p)lt+1 = 1
(1 ¡ p)It = peD
t
(18)
with the rest de…ned as in (17). To prove the existence of the stationary
point it su¢ces to prove the existence of a solution to
wt+1 = ©0(wt) = wt
Substitute now wt+1 instead of wt into the labour demand, the credit
demand and savings functions in (18). This reduces the problem to the case
of …nding the equilibrium. The slope of LM-line stays unchanged, since it
depends only on wt+1, and the slope of LM-line is always ‡atter than that
of the LM-line (see 14). As a result, the general equilibrium exists for any
value of wt, and in particular for some value b w, for which the condition
©0(b w) = b w is met. By construction, this steady state does not depend on
initial conditions.
133.2.2 After the shock
Consider now the evolution of the economy after the shock q = q¤ < 1, i.e. for







¿ < 0; with which they start the period ¿+1. A change
in de…cits (d falls from d¿ = 0 to a negative level d¿+1 < 0) causes CM-line to
shift upwards (for any wage level, the credit market will clear with a higher
interest rate). Consequently the change in general equilibrium is given by
the LM-line, and the equilibrium wage level w¿+2 is lower than w¿+1 = w¿.
Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate increases from r¿ to r¿+1: No new
shocks and no changes in the behavior of the agents occur. State guarantees
on deposits insure that there is no panics among depositors after the shock,
and there are no incentives for workers to deposit less than prescribed by the
solution to the optimisation problem (1). Further dynamics of the de…cits in
banks is given by































which is valid for any k 2 N: As soon as r¤
¿+k > 0, de…cits in banks
increase until banking system is bankrupt, i.e. d¿+k = d¿+k = ¡peD
¿+k. This
last condition means that the newly accumulated deposits just cover the
de…cits in banking system so that no new credits can be granted. Hence,
banks obtain zero repayments at the end of the period, and cannot meet
their obligations with respect to deposits anymore.
Corollary 1 Intermediated economy with long-lived banks and guarantees
on deposits experiences a collapse of banking system in the absence of an
appropriate regulation in a …nite number of periods.
4 Pure market economy
Consider now a market economy, in which savers (depositors) have direct
access to the …rms (entrepreneurs) and therefore, no intermediation in funds
14Figure 3: Sequence of events in the pure market economy
channelling occurs. The sequence of events in the pure market economy is
presented in Fig. 3.
The economy without intermediation (pure market economy) exhibits the
same equilibrium as in the case of intermediated economy with zero de…cits
in banks. Indeed, in the pure market economy aggregate demand for credits





equals their aggregate supply peD
t and since
intermediaries are not presented here, there is no space for de…cits in the
market equilibrium. The equilibrium in the labour market does not depend
on intermediation and is the same as in intermediated case. The savings
interest rate in the pure market economy is equal to the credit interest rate
rd
t = rc
t = rt, as there is only one market for them.
A temporary general equilibrium in the pure market economy in any













under parameter fwt;dtg, which provide that:







2. The labour market is cleared: (1 ¡ p)l(rc
t;wt+1) = 1
153. No agent has an incentive to make any changes in their choices (this
condition is again met by the optimal choice of agents).
Proposition 4 A general equilibrium in the market economy, given by the
de…nition above, exists and is unique for any period t > 0.
Proof.
The proof of the proposition follows from the existence of an equilibrium
for intermediated economy. It remains only tobe noted that dt nowrepresents
(in consistency with its de…nition) the di¤erence between credit repayments
from old entrepreneurs and the amount actually received by the old workers
(reduced for the shock-induced transaction costs) and is always zero in the
absence of shocks.
Without shocks the equilibrium in the pure market economy reaches its
steady state as in the case of intermediated economy.
If the shock occurs, creditors are not repaid in full11 and experience a
de…cit dt+1 = ¡(1¡q¤)pBt. This changes the result in the following manner:
1. Old workers, who acted as creditors, obtain less repayment than ex-
pected and their consumption in the shock period is less than needed
to achieve the planned utility level. The extreme case q¤ = 0 would
leave old workers with zero consumption in the shock period.
2. Young workers do not su¤er if we only consider payments shock.12
Savings decisions of the young generation repeat those of the old one
in the preceding period so that the equilibrium persists.
3. After the shock the system stays at the steady state so that the only
part of population, which su¤ered from the shock, are old workers.
Their loss in consumption is exactly dt+1 = ¡(1 ¡ q¤)pBt.
Corollary 2 A market-based economy recovers to the steady state within one
period after the shock, leaving the burden of the shock completely on savers
of this period.
11This can be understood as though the shock appears when the repayment goes through
the payment system, which is not explicitely modeled here.
12In case of a production shock it may happen that the young workers obtain reduced
wage repayments, which would change their savings decisions. In this case market economy
recovers slower. For the case of a production shock see Vinogradov (2003).
165 Regulation
The collapse of the intermediated economy after the shock underlines the
need for a regulatory intervention to avoid the collapse. We consider two
possible regulatory interventions:
1. Liquidity injections13 to banks
2. Setting a deposit rate ceiling
In both cases we assume banks to be credible institutions (possibly under
guarantees of the Regulator) so that the question of credibility and bank runs
does not arise.
5.1 Liquidity injections
Assume that the Regulator possesses a stock S of liquid funds, which can
only be accessed by banks experiencing de…cits and are not used otherwise.
If de…cits occur (dt < 0), banks can apply for one-period credits with interest
rate rs from the Regulator. This is a general formulation: setting rs = ¡1
corresponds to the case of a subsidy. The total amount of credits granted by




¡dt, if dt < 0
0 if dt ¸ 0 (21)
Credits from the Regulator are granted at the end of period t, cover
de…cits accrued in period t, last for one period and are repaid at the end of
period t + 1 in total amount of (1 + rs)St.









t + dt + St (22)
To complete the description we assume that the interest (if any) gained on
such liquidity injections is used to increase the stock S. We do not consider
possible …scal distortions (taxes and income redistribution) and focus only
on the bailout e¤ect of such intervention.
13Rochet (2004) calls it a liquidity assistance.
175.2 Deposit rate ceiling
The Regulator sets a deposit rate ceiling rd = rdreg as soon as the capital
adequacy ratio is not ful…lled (surplus accumulated in the banks is smaller
than a certain fraction of the total banking assets)14:







In this case, two situations are possible. First, either credit rates are be-
low the ceiling, in which case no bank is interested in setting the deposit
rate above the credit rate, and hence the situation coincide with unregulated
economy with rc = rd = r¤. Second, the credit rate (the interest rate de-
termined by the credit market) is above the ceiling, which means that the








Fixing the deposit rate makes deposit supply dependant only on the wage
level; the deposit market is still in equilibrium (all deposits supplied are
acquired by banks). The conclusion regarding the existence and uniqueness
of the general equilibrium remains unchanged.
The de…nition of the general equilibrium from Part 3 is valid for the
regulated case as well. Moreover, the equilibrium condition for the labour
market is not disturbed by introducing the regulation since it depends only
on the credit interest rate:
(1 ¡ p)l(r
c
t;wt+1) = 1 (25)















so that the right-hand side no longer depends on the credit interest rate.
Obviously the equilibrium credit rate is negatively related with regulated
deposit rate, since the left-hand side negatively depends on the credit rate:
@rc
t
@rdreg < 0: This is easily explained by the fact that decreasing deposit rate
14This is again a general formulation. In the economy considered in this paper banks’
surplus is zero due to competition. Therefore a deposit rate ceiling is introduced from the
beginning.
18leads to less deposits in the banks and therefore to lower supply of credits,
which become more expensive in order to hold the equilibrium. Hence, set-
ting the regulated deposit rate at the level below that of the unregulated
equilibrium increases the credit interest rate. This makes banks’ pro…t mar-
gin positive (since in unregulated case the rates are equal). Graphically this
corresponds to the shift of CM-line upwards as soon as the regulated deposit
interest rate is set below the equilibrium level, similarly to the case of an
increase in de…cits, which is depicted in Fig. 1.
6 Intermediated economy: regulated dynam-
ics
Assume the economy has settled in the steady state with dt = 0. Consider
the manner in which the above mentioned regulatory interventions a¤ect the
economy after the shock. This will exlain, whether theses interventions pre-
vent the bankruptcy of the banking system, which happened in unregulated
case.
6.1 Liquidity injections
Assume a payments shock a¤ects the de…cits in the banking system in period
¿, so that the banking systemstarts period ¿+1 with de…cits d¿+1 < 0. Credit









¿+1 + d¿+1 + S¿+1 (27)
Since subsidy (credits) from the Regulator exactly covers the de…cits,
S¿+1 = ¡d¿+1, the equilibrium in the credit market is unchanged, and hence
the credit interest rate as well as the wage stay at their stationary levels.
Further change in de…cits is given now by


















¿+1 ¡ (1 + r
s)S¿+1
(28)
From this point two scenarios are possible:
1. The liquidity injection does not change pro…t expectations of the banks
(for whatever reason). The expected pro…t of the banks for the period























The expected pro…t is equal to zero due to competition in the banking
sector. This implies
d¿+2 = ¡(1 + r
s)S¿+1 = (1 + r
s)d¿+1 (29)
Hence, with rs > 0, de…cits in banking sector increase further. Unre-
stricted continuation of the liquidity injections policy repeats the above
described steps and, as in the case of unregulated dynamics, a collapse
is unavoidable; the banking system is bankrupt. The stock of liquid
funds S can not be exhausted, since starting in period ¿ +2 de…cits in
the banking system are constituted only of the debt before the Regula-
tor so that the "liquidity" injections do not actually require the transfer
of liquid funds, but rather take a form of "virtual" credits, which only
result in accumulation of unpaid interest. Setting rs = 0 allows one to
postpone the collapse without accumulation of debt. However in any
case, such forbearance policy15 does not create any incentives for banks
to repay their debt to the Regulator since the banks expect the de…cits
to be continuously covered by new liquidity injections from the Regu-
lator without any restrictions and do not account for the repayments
in their pro…t expectations.16
2. The liquidity injection changes pro…t expectations of the banks. Ex-
pected pro…t of the banks for period ¿ + 2 accounts for the repayment
of credit to the Regulator:
¦
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Zero expected pro…t (due to competition) implies that the banks set
the deposit interest rate below the credit one, which is …xed by credit
15Remember, banks are formally bankrupts, since their assets are below their liabilities.
16The case of subsidy (rs < 0) would prevent collapse but requires substantial changes
in the model to meet budget constraints; it is assumed there are no external in‡ow of
funds into the economy.
20market equilibrium (27), as soon as rs > ¡1. The new level of de…cits
in banking system is
d¿+2 = 0
At the same time, the amount of deposits in the banking sector de-
creases due to a decrease in deposit interest rate (eD
¿+1 < eD
¿ ) and the
credit market is cleared with a higher credit interest rate for any wage






¿+1. This corresponds to an upward
shift of CM-line in Fig. 1. The new equilibrium is achieved at the level
rc
¿+1 > rc
¿, w¿+2 < w¿+1.



























The discussion above leads to the following conclusions:
Corollary 3 Liquidity injections after the payments shock can have di¤erent
e¤ects depending on the arrangements:
1. The forbearance policy of the Regulator, in which the banks believe to be
credited and are credited each time they face de…cits, either postpones
the collapse (if injections are made in form of credits with zero interest
rate) or prevents the collapse (in case of the subsidy). In both cases the
burden of payments shock is borne by the Regulator.
2. Short-term crediting with su¢cient restrictions on further access for
banks to the liquid funds of the Regulators shifts the pro…t expectations
of the banks and prevents a collapse. The burden of the payments shock
is borne by the population in the period following the shock: depositors
receive deposit interest below credit interest rate. At the same time they
receive lower wages due to a fall in production, which also leads to lower
consumption level of entrepreneurs.
216.2 Deposit rate ceiling
If the banking system starts with zero de…cits, the intervention rule (23) is
ful…lled, and regulation is introduced from the beginning. If rdreg > rc, the
deposit interest rate will be equal to credit interest rate rc = rd = r¤ so that
regulated dynamics yields the same results as the unregulated case. After
the shock, however, the credit interest rate increases, as shown for the case
of unregulated dynamics. At some point the condition rdreg < rc will be met.
This induces that the deposit rate is …xed by the regulation17.
Assume that this happens at t = ¿ + k; so that rd
¿+k = rdreg (k 2 N).
The dynamics of the de…cits in banks is then given by

















Due to rdreg < rc






























The simplest way to meet this criterion is to set rdreg = 0. However,
this sharp measure is only needed in case the system nears bankruptcy, i.e.
when (¡d¿+k) ! peD
¿+k. In all other cases this criterion can be met with
strictly positive values of deposit rate ceiling. Since the equilibrium credit
interest rate increases with the increase in bank de…cits, deposit rate ceiling
can be established at the level of stationary credit interest rate, observed in
a pre-shock economy: rdreg = rcjd=0.
Corollary 4 An economy with appropriately chosen (in sense of inequality
32) deposit rate ceiling recovers after the shock to a steady state with d = 0.
17Of course, this is only true, if the deposit rate ceiling is not set too high: rdreg < rcrit
where rcrit = arg
£
dt = ¡peD ¡
¢;rcrit¢¤
. This is the critical value of the market interest
rate, when the banking system is bankrupt, and no further development occurs.
227 Conclusions
The dynamic model in this paper incorporates both labour and capital mar-
kets and describes the role of …nancial intermediation in the evolution of
the economy after a macroeconomic shock. As stated in the analysis, a pre-
vention of the bank runs through state guarantees (deposit insurance) alone
can not help to avoid a macroeconomic collapse. This result is valid even
if the deposit insurance (bailout guarantees) cannot change the banks’ risk
incentives (since there is no possibility for shift in investment decisions of the
banks in the model). The model provides a tool for analyzing the regulatory
interventions as well as studying their e¢ciency in returning to the steady
state after a shock.
We can conclude that the existence of developed …nancial markets and
market-oriented …nancial system in a country would accelerate the recovery
after a sharp macroeconomic shock (in this paper it is the payments shock).
However, from the institutional perspective, establishing a market-oriented
…nancial system is a much more di¢cult task, especially in emerging and
developing economies. A banking system is easier to establish, but needs
proper regulation and intervention mechanisms in times of crisis to avoid
collapse. With the market-based …nancial system the burden of the crisis is
borne by the population immediately after the macroeconomic shock, and
other (perhaps …scal) measures may be needed to smoothen this burden.
Banking system allows for postponment and smoothing of the negative
e¤ects of the crisis. Postponment can be achieved through liquidity injec-
tions, and smoothing through regulatory intervention leading to a positive
banks’ pro…t margine (marge). In the …rst case, the burden of the crisis
can be shared by depositors and the Regulator and, in the second case, it is
shared between several generations of population. Moreover, a liquidity in-
jection similar to a subsidy immediately after the shock can lead to the quick
recovery exactly as in the case of the market-based system. But this kind
of injection (which could be implemented e.g. through a deposit-insurance
system) was not explicitly modeled here.
The model helps also to distinguish between the roles played by the De-
posit Insurer and the Regulator. The …rst provides the economy with the
means to avoid bank panics after the shock and the troubled …nancial in-
stitutions with subsides. But subsidization as a kind of liquidity injection
can not lead to the intertemporal smoothing of shock. At the same time a
regulatory intervention such as establishment of deposit rate ceiling provides
23necessary environment to avoid the collapse and to smoothen the shock over
several generations.
A development of this model is presented in Mavrotas and Vinogradov
(2005), who compare the above results with the empirical data regarding the
…nancial crisis in Russia in 1998.
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